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Problem, research strategy, and 
fi ndings: Mega-events such as the Olympic 
Games and the Football World Cup have 
become complex and transformative under-
takings over the last 30 years, with costs 
often exceeding USD $10 billion. These 
events are currently planned and governed in 
ways that produce adverse effects for cities, 
regions, and residents. This study identifi es a 
mega-event syndrome, a group of symptoms 
that occur together and affl ict mega-event 
planning, including overpromising benefi ts, 
underestimating costs, rewriting urban 
planning priorities to fi t the event, using 
public resources for private interest, and 
suspending the regular rule of law. I describe 
each of these symptoms, providing empirical 
examples from different countries and 
mega-events, examining the underlying 
causes. The research is based on material 
from fi eld visits to mega-event sites in 11 
countries as well as 51 interviews with 
planners, managers, politicians, and consult-
ants involved in mega-event planning.
Takeaway for practice: To curb the 
mega-event syndrome, I propose both radical 
and incremental policy suggestions. The most 
crucial radical change that an event host could 
make is to not tie mega-events to large-scale 
urban development, avoiding higher risks that 
create cost overruns, substandard construction 
quality, and oversized infrastructure not 
suitable for post-event demands. Further, 
event hosts should bargain with event-
governing bodies for better conditions, 
earmark and cap public sector contributions, 
and seek independent advice on the costs and 
benefi ts of mega-events. Event-governing 
bodies, for their part, should reduce the size 
and requirements of the events. 
The Mega-Event 
Syndrome
Why So Much Goes Wrong in Mega-Event Planning 
and What to Do About It
Martin Müller
Mega-events are one-time occasions of a fi xed duration that attract a large number of visitors and have worldwide reach. They come with signifi cant costs and long-term impacts on the built environment 
and the population of the host countries or cities. The Olympic Games and the 
Football (Soccer) World Cup are the largest mega-events, but events such as 
World’s Fairs (Expos), regional games (e.g., Pan American Games, Asian 
Games), and single sports events such as the Super Bowl are also mega-events. 
In the past three decades, mega-events have reached a size that has made 
them transformative ventures for entire cities, regions, and sometimes whole 
countries. Such events now routinely command more than USD $10 billion 
in capital investment, take up several hundred acres of land, and require the 
infrastructure to accommodate, move, and keep secure hundreds of thousands 
of visitors and tens of thousands of athletes, offi cials, and journalists. Planning 
for mega-events appropriates resources, monopolizes public attention, can 
suspend the normal rule of law, and often rewrites urban and regional develop-
ment plans. What were once primarily sports events or exhibitions have be-
come urban events: occasions for large-scale urban transformation (Essex & 
Chalkley, 1998; J. R. Gold & Gold, 2008; Hiller, 2006; Kassens-Noor, 2012). 
There is considerable disagreement about the nature of mega-event im-
pacts. Cities and countries bidding to host the events often see them as boons 
to urban development, a view endorsed by event-governing bodies such as the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and some consulting companies and 
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Müller: The Mega-Event Syndrome 7
development agencies (German Development Agency 
[GIZ], 2013; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). Some 
scholars, too, have claimed that mega-events are catalysts 
for urban development and “accelerate [a city’s] infrastruc-
tural development by up to 10 years” (Preuss, 2004, p. 
232). A few studies suggest that mega-events can create an 
economic benefi t to host cities (Gratton, Shibli, & Cole-
man, 2005), and that cities and countries can leverage 
them to improve their image and empower community 
action (Chalip, 2006; Grix, 2012). A focus on planning for 
the legacies of mega-events—what is left after the event—
has served to reinforce the idea that mega-events can be 
positive forces for urban development (Holt & Ruta, 2015; 
Jago, Dwyer, Lipman, van Lill, & Vorster, 2012).
At the same time, the negative impacts of mega-events 
on cities and regions are well documented and occur in 
almost every case. Cost overruns, schedule slips, oversized 
infrastructure, and social polarization dash the high expec-
tations for positive urban development resulting from such 
events (e.g., Boykoff, 2014; Cottle, 2011; Gaffney, 2010; 
Hayes & Horne, 2011; Horne, 2007; Shin & Li, 2013). 
Thus, since 1960, without exception, the Olympic Games 
have gone over budget, on average by 179% (Flyvbjerg & 
Stewart, 2012). After the 1994 World Cup in the United 
States, host cities experienced a net economic loss rather 
than the predicted gain (Baade & Matheson, 2004). The 
Olympic Summer Games in Athens cost at least 3.4% of 
the gross domestic product (GDP) of Greece at the time 
and left a legacy of underused sports facilities and environ-
mental destruction (M. M. Gold, 2007). In Rio de Janeiro, 
preparations for the 2014 Football World Cup and the 
2016 Olympic Games exacerbated sociospatial polariza-
tion, as authorities evicted and resettled tens of thousands 
of residents (de Paula, 2014). 
In this study, I suggest that there are common dynamics 
that plague mega-event planning everywhere in the world to 
a greater or lesser degree, or what I call the mega-event syn-
drome. The concept of “syndrome,” drawn from medicine, 
suggests the presence of a set of symptoms that occur to-
gether, recognizing that these symptoms may be interrelated 
and have shared underlying causes (Schellnhuber et al., 
1997). On the basis of 51 interviews with mega-event 
planners, managers, politicians, and consultants; fi eld visits 
to mega-event sites in 11 countries; and offi cial documents, 
polls, and media reports, I identify seven major symptoms 
that together form the mega-event syndrome and are shown 
in Table 1: overpromising benefi ts, underestimating costs, 
event takeover, public risk taking, rule of exception, elite 
capture, and event fi x. Investigating these symptoms to-
gether allows us to see them as the result of a shared complex 
of problems, shifting the focus toward the causes and drivers 
of negative outcomes. In so doing, I propose both radical 
and incremental policy suggestions to reduce the prevalence 
and size of the mega-event syndrome for future hosts. 
Table 1. The mega-event syndrome: symptoms and consequences.
Symptom Description Consequences
1. Overpromising of benefi ts Overestimating positive effects of 
mega-events
•  Misallocation of resources
•  Loss of trust with citizenry
2. Underestimation of costs Actual budget > planned budget •  Misallocation of resources
•  Profi teering
•  Subpar construction quality
•  Budget shortfalls
3. Event takeover Event priorities become planning 
priorities
•  Event needs displace urban infrastructure needs
•  Oversized infrastructure
•  Unfi nished infrastructure
4. Public risk taking Public takes risk for private 
benefi ts
•  Public funds for limited or no public benefi ts
•  Profi teering
5. Rule of exception Suspension of regular rule of law •  Displacement
•  Reduced public oversight
•  Limited public participation
6. Elite capture Inequitable distribution of 
resources
•  Spatially uneven urban landscape
•  Gentrifi cation
7. Event fi x Mega-events become seemingly 
quick fi xes for major planning 
challenges 
•  Event determines national priority for funding
•  Bypassing of regular planning process
•  Waste of resources on event as lever for urban development
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Research Approach and Materials
The primary empirical basis for this study rests on 51 
semistructured interviews and material from fi eld visits to 
mega-event sites in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), China (Beijing), 
Canada (Calgary, Vancouver), Germany (Berlin, Munich), 
Italy (Torino), Korea (Gwangju, Seoul, Yeosu), Russia 
(Kazan, Moscow, Sochi), Spain (Sevilla), Ukraine (Lviv), 
the United Kingdom (London), and the United States 
(Salt Lake City [UT]). I used site visits to collect fi rsthand 
material on the planning and afteruse of mega-event 
 facilities in a range of countries to avoid a national bias in 
the analysis. 
I conducted the interviews between 2010 and 2014 
with staff from event-governing bodies (the IOC and 
FIFA [Fédération Internationale de Football Associa-
tion, the governing body for the Football World Cup]), 
organizing committees, consultants to cities and 
 organizers, politicians, and planners. I selected inter-
viewees who had a strategic, not just an operational, 
role in the planning and preparation of mega-events or 
in managing the infrastructure after the event across a 
number of functional areas such as transport, environ-
ment, venue planning, accommodation planning, and 
knowledge management. I avoided a potential sampling 
bias that could have occurred when focusing on just 
one area of mega-event planning. All potential inter-
viewees, except two, were available and willing to speak 
with me. In those two cases, I contacted people with 
similar functions. 
The interviews covered the following thematic areas: 
the rationale for bidding and the process of assembling the 
bid documents; the guiding principles and priorities of 
planning for and managing the event and the period 
afterwards; challenges, tradeoffs, and unexpected events 
during the planning process; the infl uence of different 
stakeholders on the planning and management process and 
on outcomes; positive and negative outcomes; and the 
reasons why some outcomes differed from initial expecta-
tions. The exact questions varied according to the role of 
the person interviewed and the specifi c mega-event. I used 
an interview guide for conducting interviews that 
 contained open-ended questions refl ecting these areas of 
inquiry. While I did not share the exact questions in 
 advance, I did outline the general theme of the interview in 
all my requests.
I took several steps, common for qualitative methods 
(see McMillan & Schumacher, 1997), to establish that 
the material collected was valid and that I correctly 
understood the responses made by those I interviewed. 
First, I made sure that interviewees were comfortable 
with the interview language. Most interviewees were 
fl uent in English, so I conducted most interviews in 
 English. In one case the interviewee preferred Russian, 
and in one case the interviewee preferred German, both 
languages I speak fl uently. Second, I audio-recorded all 
interviews, after receiving permission, and transcribed 
them in the original language to allow for exact 
 reproduction. 
After each of the fi rst fi ve interviews, I revised the 
guide where I thought interviewees had not understood the 
intent of the questions or the wording of questions was 
imprecise. I also asked interviewees if they agreed with 
statements made by other interviewees to determine the 
level of agreement. I then coded interviews into themes 
and subthemes to compare the material across interviewees 
and fi eld sites. I did not work with a preestablished 
 codebook, but generated codes from the material to reduce 
the risk of preconceived ideas infl uencing how I structured 
the material. 
When I quote material here, I rely on experiences that 
interviewees reported more than once to avoid basing the 
analysis on unusual statements. During the site visits, I was 
able to compare the statements of those interviewed against 
my own observations. 
I believe this method is a conservative approach to 
understanding the critical aspects of mega-event planning 
because I interviewed people who may have an interest in 
downplaying the problems and the challenges of mega-
events in which they themselves were involved. My 
 approach guards against an excessively pessimistic stance 
that could result from interviewing those opposed to 
mega-events. Moreover, these interviews and my 
 interpretation of the responses are the result of fi ve years of 
fi eldwork on various mega-events.
In addition to interviews and site visits, I use material 
such as bidding documents and hosting guidelines, surveys, 
and media reports, which are publicly available. To 
 complement this primary material, I integrate additional 
evidence from the existing academic literature on mega-
events. These materials form the basis for extracting the 
seven symptoms of the mega-event syndrome, which I 
describe below.
The Mega-Event Syndrome
Symptom 1: Overpromising of Benefi ts
This symptom refers to the mismatch between the 
expected and the actual benefi ts of a mega-event. This is 
particularly evident in the bid book, the document orga-
nizers submit to an event-governing body such as the IOC 
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Müller: The Mega-Event Syndrome 9
or FIFA as an application to host the event. The bid book 
makes promises about the outcomes of the event and 
becomes part of the contract between a host and the event-
governing body. Bid books promulgate a vision of urban 
transformation, with associated costs and benefi ts. They 
serve as key documents for decision-makers to evaluate 
whether to host an event and fund the expenditure.
Yet, the promises in bid books are not a realistic 
 statement of what cities want to do and can achieve with 
the event-governing bodies. As one member of staff in an 
organizing committee stated: 
The bid book is science fi ction—an imaginary case.... 
International consultants put into the bid book what 
they knew that the IOC would like and buy, and when 
we got the Games it was all of a sudden like, 
“Whoooa, we have to deliver on all that and we had no 
idea how to do that.” (interview with staff of organiz-
ing committee)
Overpromising is also widespread when prospective 
hosts forecast the economic impacts of mega-events. The 
mayor of Chicago, for example, in the city’s bid to host the 
2015 Olympic Games, promised that hosting the event 
would create 315,000 new jobs, a forecast more than four 
times the estimate for the Olympics in Atlanta (GA) in 
1996 and dismissed as crazy by sports economist Victor 
Matheson (quoted in Pletz, 2009; see also Eisinger, 2000; 
Matheson, 2008). However unrealistic a given fi gure for 
economic impacts may be, it still produces an important 
psychological anchoring effect, creating the impression that 
mega-events come with economic gains (Tversky & 
 Kahneman, 1974). Thus, in a survey in 16 countries, 68% 
of respondents reported that hosting the Olympic Games 
is an “opportunity for economic development” and 73% 
thought it “leaves the host city with many benefi ts” 
(Kantar, 2014).
Sports economists, however, are in rare unanimity that 
providing subsidies for mega-events is, at best, a subopti-
mal use of public money and incurs signifi cant opportunity 
costs (Baumann & Matheson, 2013; Crompton, 1995; 
Jennings, 2012; Madden, 2006; Matheson, 2008; Mills & 
Rosentraub, 2013; Zimbalist, 2015). The 1994 Winter 
Olympic Games in Lillehammer, for example, cost 100 
times more than a tourism development program the 
Norwegian government ran in parallel, yet the increase in 
overnight stays due to the Games was only twice as large as 
that of the tourism program (Teigland, 1999). 
Despite this poor record, cities and countries continue 
to bid for mega-events because the event promoters tend to 
profi t most from such events. Mega-events bring prestige 
for sports offi cials; profi t for property developers, construc-
tion fi rms, and landowners; and a chance to shine for 
politicians. It is this unequal distribution of costs and 
benefi ts (see Logan & Molotch, 1987) that continues to 
produce bids, although the promised benefi ts hardly ever 
materialize. 
Symptom 2: Underestimation of Costs
This symptom is the alter ego of overpromising ben-
efi ts. Like most mega-projects (Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 
2002; Priemus, Flyvbjerg, & van Wee, 2008), mega-events 
overrun their budget, sometimes massively so. The most 
blatant example is the 2010 Commonwealth Games in 
New Delhi (India); initially estimated to cost about USD 
$50 million, the actual total budget was more than USD 
$4 billion (INR 280 billion; High Level Committee for 
 Commonwealth Games 2010, 2011). The Olympic Games 
always overrun their initial budget. The average cost 
 overrun for the Olympic Games since 1960, including 
operating and direct capital costs, is 179%: much more 
than the 27% average overrun for transport mega-projects 
(Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012). 
Many factors drive organizers to underestimate the 
costs of mega-events. First, unlike other mega-projects, 
mega-events have a fi xed deadline. Postponing the opening 
date is not an option when preparations fall behind 
 schedule, so event organizers will hire additional workers or 
add nightshifts. In addition, when construction has to be 
rushed, competitive bidding (tendering) rules are relaxed, 
reducing competition and driving prices up further. 
Second, mega-events cannot be gradually ramped up; 
they are nondivisible (i.e., all competitions need to run 
from day one at full force). Thus, there is no room for trial 
and error, and that comes with a high cost. Third, when 
work is running late, contractors engage in profi teering; 
they know that event organizers are dependent on them to 
fi nish work in time. The closer the opening date looms, the 
more contractors will ask for large premiums to fi nish work 
in time. Fourth, mega-event planners operate with large 
contingencies, lacking knowledge about the demand 
 patterns during previous events in other cities. They build 
infrastructure larger than needed because there is substan-
tial uncertainty about the demand, such as for public 
transport on a particular day during the event. This 
 uncertainty results from the exceptional character of the 
event and is exacerbated by lack of knowledge of usage at 
previous events.
Fifth, mega-events have a long implementation period, 
often more than 10 years from the initial idea to the fi nal 
execution. During this time, many of the initial assump-
tions are subject to change. Infl ation, for example, can 
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increase due to the additional demand that a mega-event 
creates. External events, such as terrorist attacks, can in-
crease costs for security. New regulations or demands can 
make it necessary to expand the scope of the budget. What 
compounds this uncertainty is that the event-governing 
bodies tend to leave some requirements deliberately vague 
in their contracts with host cities, postponing concrete 
specifi cations to a later stage, as in the FIFA Host City 
Agreement. This makes it diffi cult for cities to engage in 
reliable advance planning and budgeting and increases the 
risk of changes at short notice that increase costs.
Sixth and last, there is an incentive for event promoters 
to misrepresent the true cost  of an event. There are two main 
reasons for this. Bids need to garner public support, both 
because governing bodies of the events demand that a major-
ity of the population be in favor of the event and because in 
many countries the public or the government can—but do 
not have to—initiate referenda on bids. Munich, St. Moritz, 
and Krakow, for instance, had to withdraw from bidding for 
the 2022 Winter Games because of failed referenda. Also, 
potential host cities compete at the national level for nomi-
nation as the national candidate for the event, often with 
guarantees of public subsidies. It is imperative that a pro-
posed project looks as inexpensive as possible to engage 
public support and improve chances for nomination as the 
national candidate with the attached national subsidies.
Symptom 3: Event Takeover
Mega-event priorities often displace long-term urban 
development priorities. Instead of the event becoming an 
instrument for urban development, urban development 
becomes the instrument for the event. The most extreme 
example is perhaps Rio de Janeiro, which in the space of 
10 years hosted the Pan American Games (2007), the 
Football World Cup (2014), and the Olympic Games 
(2016), ending up “with an urban structure that was—for 
over two decades—purely driven by sporting events” 
(Kassens-Noor, 2012, p. 105). The mayor of Rio, Eduardo 
Paes, acknowledged that mega-event priorities are what 
drive Rio’s development planning: “The Olympic plan is 
Rio’s plan, and Rio’s plan is the Olympics” (quoted in 
Nuzman, 2011).
Event takeover has two major characteristics. The fi rst 
is that event requirements crowd out actual urban infra-
structure needs, both in spatial and fi nancial terms. Venues 
for hosting an event occupy space, often in prime locations 
of a city, that could be used for other public facilities with 
broader or more sustained public benefi t. The venues for 
the Summer Olympics, for example, require an area of 
almost 700 hectares (1,730 acres), not including ancillary 
infrastructure such as the Olympic Village, ceremonial 
spaces, parking areas, etc. (Long, 2013). These require-
ments increase competition for the use of scarce urban land 
in densely populated cities. 
But crowding out also happens in a fi nancial sense: As 
the event nears and budgets are squeezed, sports-related 
facilities prevail over wider urban improvements. Stadia, 
athlete accommodation, media centers, airport extensions—
all of them contractual obligations to the governing bodies 
of the event—appropriate budgets originally meant to 
improve housing, community facilities, or public transport, 
undermining long-term urban development priorities and 
public preferences.
Second, building for the demands of the event often 
does not refl ect post-event needs. Fulfi lling the require-
ments of event-governing bodies for airport or public 
transit capacity, for example, requires the host city to tailor 
the size of the project to peak event demand, which is 
often too large for effi cient post-event use. Since event-
governing bodies set the requirements for infrastructure, 
but do not pay for its delivery, they have an incentive to 
demand excessively large stadia, airports, or hotel capaci-
ties. The airport in Lviv (Ukraine), upgraded to meet the 
requirements of UEFA, the governing body of the Euro-
pean Football Championship, now boasts a capacity of 
20,000 passengers per day. However, it was running at 
10% of that capacity in 2013, one year after Ukraine 
hosted the championship. 
Building many event venues in the same area exacer-
bates the problem of oversized infrastructure. This risk is 
particularly high for Olympic parks, which have several 
stadia with large seating capacities. To accommodate the 
transit demand during the event, organizers build large 
capacities and plan rail transit lines to optimize the move-
ment of event visitors. However, these arrangements often 
do not refl ect the post-event demands. After the 2014 
Winter Games in Sochi (Russia), for example, the com-
bined road and rail link between the airport and the 
venue  clusters, built for more than USD $10 billion, 
became too expensive to operate. Sydney (Australia), too, 
built a transit system for the 2000 Summer Games that 
was too large for post-event use; moreover, its route 
system is not geared to post-event travel patterns 
(Kassens-Noor, 2012). 
Symptom 4: Public Risk Taking
The public sector provides the defi cit guarantee de-
manded by event-governing bodies in almost all cases, thus 
accepting the risk of failure. The government must deliver 
the defi ned facilities and infrastructure and cover all budget 
shortfalls, while the profi ts accrue to the event-governing 
bodies and the contractors. This guarantee encourages 
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Müller: The Mega-Event Syndrome 11
profi teering: Contractors know that the government is 
obliged to fi nish the project regardless of price.1
Cities hosting mega-events portray them as a way of 
attracting private capital in an environment of increasing 
interurban competition (Andranovich, Burbank, & Heying, 
2001; Burbank, Andranovich, & Heying, 2002; French & 
Disher, 1997; Hall, 2006). But investors tend to be wary of 
investing in sports facilities and ancillary infrastructure 
(Long, 2012; see Rosentraub [1999] for the case of sports 
facilities in the United States). The taxpayers almost always 
pay a higher share for the event than planned. The organiz-
ers of the 2014 Football World Cup in Brazil and the 2014 
Winter Games in Russia expected private investment to 
make up most of the funding for the event, but in both cases 
the public was forced to pay more than 95% of the costs 
(Fund for the Fight Against Corruption, 2014;  Gaffney, 
2014). London and Vancouver tried to attract private inves-
tors for the Olympic villages, but had to bail them out after 
the fi nancial crisis (Scherer, 2011). 
Symptom 5: Rule of Exception
Mega-events are exceptional happenings and so, too, is 
the time during which the hosts prepare for them. The 
preparation for most mega-events includes special legisla-
tion that suspends the regular rules to facilitate hosting the 
event (Coaffee, 2014; Sánchez & Broudehoux, 2013). 
Many governments pass laws that introduce exceptions in 
areas such as taxation, immigration, property rights, urban 
planning, and freedom of speech. Governments, for 
 example, have to provide tax exemptions on some revenues 
accruing to event-governing bodies and award franchises or 
monopolies that go beyond existing legislation (Louw, 
2012). For the World Cup in Brazil, tax authorities 
 estimated that these exemptions would cost roughly USD 
$250 million (BRL 559 million) in foregone tax revenue 
(de Paula, 2014). 
But cities and countries may also curtail citizen rights 
without explicit requirements from event-governing bod-
ies. Vancouver, for example, introduced a bylaw outlawing 
placards, posters, and banners that did not celebrate the 
Olympic Games in 2010 (Boykoff, 2011). The mayor of 
Boston signed a decree that forbade city employees from 
criticizing the Olympics during the city’s bid to host the 
event in 2024 (Levenson, 2015). Both cities, however, had 
to repeal these decisions following legal challenges. 
It is common for hosts to expropriate private property 
and displace residents during the run-up for a mega-event in 
democratic and authoritarian countries alike (Centre on 
Housing Rights and Evictions [COHRE], 2007; Porter 
et al., 2009). Targeted legislation facilitates expropriation and 
displacement (Davis, 2011; Olds, 1998). A special report by 
COHRE, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) support-
ing the cause of equal housing rights, states that several 
hundred to several thousand people were displaced for a 
number of mega-events, mostly to clear the ground to build 
facilities to host the event (COHRE, 2007).2
Symptom 6: Elite Capture
Proponents often justify hosting a mega-event because 
it will create broad societal benefi ts. Yet, mega-event 
 planning tends to privilege local business and real estate 
interests, global corporations, and the cronies of the politi-
cal elites (Andranovich et al., 2001; Shaw, 2012; compare 
with Logan & Molotch, 1987). In Brazil, for example, 
several well-connected construction fi rms—known as the 
“four sisters”—pocketed the lion’s share of public contracts 
for the 2014 World Cup, producing vast cost overruns 
(Belisário, 2014). Moreover, new infrastructure often gives 
priority to airports, which cater to the highly mobile strata 
of society. Even the sports stadia themselves have a 
 tendency to turn into socially exclusive spaces if ticket 
prices multiply to recoup at least part of the high cost of 
the venues, as in Brazil (Gaffney, 2014). 
Event-induced gentrifi cation contributes to elite capture 
and is a phenomenon that has become a familiar sight in 
most mega-event host cities that harness events for urban 
regeneration, from Atlanta (Rutheiser, 1997) and Sydney to 
Vancouver (Lenskyj, 2008), London (Watt, 2013), and Rio 
(Gaffney, 2010). In Stratford in East London, where the 
Olympic Park is located, the Olympic Games accelerated 
gentrifi cation and displacement of residents (Watt, 2013). 
Mega-events thus generate both the fi nancial capital required 
for urban regeneration and the symbolic capital needed to 
make areas attractive for wealthier residents. 
At the same time, elite capture curtails public oversight 
and participation. While event organizers want public 
support during the bid, the participation of the public is 
often considered expendable or is reduced once a city has 
won. Planning for mega-events then turns into a techno-
cratic process of delivery and democratic demands become 
risks that threaten to delay the planning and construction 
process of the event (Raco, 2014; see also Andranovich 
et al., 2001; Hiller, 2000). Event-governing bodies some-
times perceive even democratic decision making as a nui-
sance, delaying and derailing the preparation for the event. 
Jérôme Valcke, Secretary General of FIFA, underscored 
that by saying, “Less democracy is sometimes better for 
organizing a World Cup” (quoted in Reuters, 2013). 
Symptom 7: Event Fix
Event fi x occurs when mega-events become seemingly 
quick fi xes to fast-track major urban development projects: 
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a “shot of adrenalin” for cities to clean up their act and get 
projects done that would otherwise have stalled or never 
happened. As the deputy mayor of Lviv, host to the 2012 
European Football Championship, said: 
Hosting a mega-event is like when the aunt from 
Canada comes to visit—you repair the house, you 
make a spring cleaning—when over the whole year 
you keep throwing around the rubbish. (podium 
discussion, November 2012)
As a result, cities and countries spend large sums on 
hosting an event to justify or create enough pressure to 
attain the non-sports investments they want to pursue. 
The rule of exception provides support for doing this: For 
example, where proper environmental impact asssessments, 
full tenders, or due diligence are considered too cumber-
some, organizing a mega-event permits the short-circuiting 
of regular planning procedures.
Mega-events produce or force consensus where plan-
ning proposals may not have been able to do so, thus 
pushing through potentially contentious projects as necessi-
ties for the event. Mega-events also can serve as a lever to 
extract funds for local governments from the central gov-
ernment. As the former mayor of London, Ken Living-
stone, said: 
I didn’t bid for the Olympics because I wanted three 
weeks of sport. I bid for the Olympics because it’s the 
only way to get the billions of pounds out of the 
Government to develop the East End. (quoted in 
Davies, 2008)
As a consequence, the central government allocates 
funding for urban development, not based on proven need 
or whether the projects support local master plans, but on 
whether a city manages to be successful in bidding for an 
event. Mega-events thus become a wildcard, allowing cities 
to jump to the front of the queue for government support. 
Policy Suggestions
Cities, national governments, and governing bodies of 
events all have good reasons to reduce the negative fallout 
from mega-events. Cities, national governments, and 
citizens should want to avoid cost overruns, ineffi cient 
allocation of resources, and oversized infrastructure.3 
Event-governing bodies, such as the IOC for the Olympic 
Games or FIFA for the Football World Cup, are concerned 
about their reputation, which constitutes their key capital. 
They also worry about losing potential hosts if cities start 
to perceive mega-events as expensive burdens. Among 
event-governing bodies, the IOC has been the most active 
in pursuing reforms, attempting to reduce the size of 
individual mega-events, integrate each one with urban 
development, and maximize the use of existing or 
 temporary infrastructure.4
But why is it so diffi cult to offset the mega-event 
syndrome? First, the IOC and other event-governing 
bodies set the minimum size of infrastructure, but they 
cannot set the maximum size. Thus, even if the govern-
ing bodies set lower requirements, local organizers may 
not translate those requirements into smaller infrastruc-
ture investments and expenditures. Second, elites orga-
nize the bid for an event in most host countries and 
cities, precisely because they profi t most from the events 
(see Logan & Molotch, 1987). Hosts continue to bid 
because of the unequal distribution of costs and benefi ts, 
despite negative outcomes for cities and regions as a 
whole. Third, the spectacular character of mega-events 
grips people and fi res their imaginations, often sidelining 
rational deliberations about an event’s benefi ts and costs, 
especially during the bidding phase. The fantasies at-
tached to these events often turn out to be illusory the 
closer the event draws, but then it is too late for second 
thoughts. 
At the policy level, as Table 2 illustrates, there are two 
avenues to address the mega-event syndrome. The fi rst is 
radical changes: changes to the rules and legal preconditions 
Table 2. Policy changes for curbing the mega-event syndrome.
Radical Changes
Symptoms 
addressed Incremental Changes
Symptoms 
addressed
Avoid tying mega-events to large-scale urban development 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 Seek public participation beginning in the bid stage 3, 4, 6
Bargain with event-governing bodies 2, 3, 4 Fix terms of hosting agreement at the time of bidding 3
Cap and earmark public expenditure 2, 3, 4, 7 Create a separate organization in charge of legacies 3, 4
Seek independent expert assessments 1, 2, 3 Decentralize the event 3
Reduce or cap size and requirements of events 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Build temporary structures where afteruse is uncertain 3
Engage in knowledge exchange 2, 3
Do not bypass regular planning procedures 5, 6
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Müller: The Mega-Event Syndrome 13
of awarding, hosting, and funding mega-events. These 
 require a change in attitude among policymakers, city 
 administrations, event managers, and event-governing 
bodies. But these changes will often not occur without 
pressure, through media, social movements, referenda, or 
from corporate sponsors of the event. The second avenue 
to address the mega-event syndrome is through incremental 
changes to the current rules and policies. These policy 
changes are easier to implement, but they are also less 
effective. 
Two main actors are responsible for implementing 
these changes—hosts and event-governing bodies—and in 
many cases both need to work together for a change to be 
most effective. 
Radical Changes
Avoid Tying Mega-Events to Large-Scale Urban 
Development. Cities need to change the current trend 
of tying large-scale development projects to mega-events. 
They have to establish, before starting to bid, whether 
the events require extensive new construction or upgrad-
ing of existing infrastructure. If so, cities have three 
options: Bid for smaller events; build the required infra-
structure before the bid, but only if it aligns with the 
master plan; or do not bid at all. Event-governing bodies 
could support this change by preferring bids with exist-
ing  infrastructure.5 The 1984 Summer Olympic Games 
in Los Angeles is one example where organizers relied to 
a large degree on existing infrastructure (see Burbank et 
al., 2002), thus reducing many symptoms of the mega-
event  syndrome.
Bargain With Event-Governing Bodies. The IOC, 
FIFA, UEFA, and others are monopolies that can dictate 
their terms and make substantial risk-free income, as long 
as there is enough demand for their events. Host cities 
should attempt to gain concessions from event-governing 
bodies, including fewer requirements, full taxation of 
revenues, waiving government guarantees, or additional 
contributions to cover the cost of hosting. 
But one of two things needs to happen to allow better 
bargaining with the governing bodies. The fi rst is that 
interest in bidding for an event needs to drop substantially, 
which is what happened after the excesses of the 1976 
Olympic Games in Montréal, when Los Angeles was the 
only bidder for the 1984 Olympics. As a result, Los Angeles 
was able to wring signifi cant concessions from the IOC. 
Second, those interested in bidding must band 
 together to bargain with event-governing bodies for 
 better conditions, thus contesting monopoly power. If this 
collective bargaining does not happen, interested bidders 
could negotiate individually. Oslo, a bidder for the 2022 
Winter Games, was able to win concessions from the IOC 
to bear part of its costs (Butler, 2014). However, the suc-
cess of bargaining depends on the willingness of the event-
governing body to make concessions, the demand for the 
event, and the bargaining power of the host. Large markets 
such as the United States will exercise more power than 
smaller  markets such as South Korea. 
Cap and Earmark Public Expenditure. The hosts 
should cap expenditures and earmark the funds to avoid 
having the public sector compensate for mega-event cost 
overruns and ventures that lose money. Capping expendi-
tures reduces the risk of profi teering and overspending; 
earmarking prevents funds for urban development from 
being diverted to hosting the event itself. Host cities should 
involve the private sector in risk taking to ensure the 
commercial viability of facilities and to reduce the exposure 
of the public sector. Cities and governments should not 
give blanket guarantees to cover all costs. 
In addion, national governments should not provide 
extra funding for urban development to support mega-
events; this encourages bidding for mega-events just for the 
sake of extracting these funds. Making funding decisions 
this way raises the total cost of infrastructure delivery to 
society and perverts other ways of determining funding 
priorities, such as regional and national infrastructure 
planning processes. Of course, the degree to which a host 
can enforce a spending cap will depend on legal and 
 economic circumstances. 
Seek Independent Expert Assessments. Independent 
expert advice is crucial for decision- makers in the cities, 
national governments, organizing committees, and govern-
ing bodies of the event. Such advice could take the form of 
reference class forecasting, a method that compares the 
predicted costs and benefi ts of a large number of mega-
events—the so-called reference class—with the actual ones 
after the events have taken place. This approach determines 
how much predicted and actual costs and benefi ts di-
verged, and provides a better assessment of the bidding 
documents (Lovallo &  Kahneman, 2003). 
Reduce or Cap Size and Requirements of Events. 
Reversing the constant growth of mega-events would 
reduce the size of the required venues and infrastructure 
and thus the risk of event takeover, the complexity of the 
management and thus the risk of cost overruns and benefi t 
shortfalls, and the size of the overall building program and 
thus the necessity to introduce extralegal measures to 
complete it in time. The event-governing bodies could 
scale down the event by reducing the number of athletes 
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and sports, the number of media, or the number of 
 visitors. Reducing the number of visitors appears to be the 
most viable option, while specifi c sports or events could be 
included on a rotational basis or made to share venues. 
Incremental Changes
Seek Public Participation Beginning in the Bid 
Stage. Citizen involvement reduces the risk that mega-
event priorities will take precedence over urban develop-
ment priorities and ensures that citizens can have a say in 
mega-event planning. Public hearings and planning consul-
tations with stakeholders, as Vancouver held for the 2010 
Olympic Games, not only facilitate a better alignment of 
infrastructure with citizen needs but also build consensus 
and reduce potential opposition. Organizers or citizens can 
call a public referendum (in jurisdictions where legislation 
 provides for this) to let the population decide whether or 
not to host the event. Thus, the promoters of Boston’s bid 
for the 2024 Summer Olympics decided to organize a 
referendum after public support had dropped to just 36% 
(Seelye, 2015). 
Fix Terms of Hosting Agreement at the Time of 
Bidding. Hosts should avoid signing any contracts that 
leave requirements deliberately vague or that postpone 
concrete specifi cations to a later stage. This vagueness 
makes it diffi cult for cities and countries to plan and 
budget in advance. Oslo, in its bid for the 2022 Winter 
Games, successfully insisted that the IOC would not 
retroactively introduce new requirements that would lead 
to higher costs for the city (Butler, 2014). 
Create a Separate Organization in Charge 
of Legacies. A separate organization must ensure that what 
is left after the event—the so-called legacies—contributes 
to the long-term development of a city and region. This 
organization should be created at the bid stage and have a 
say in all matters of planning that reach beyond the event. 
This activity should have clear funding sources at the time 
of the bid. London has such an organization, but it was 
created after the bid was won; Vancouver’s comparable 
organization only had responsibilities for the the social 
dimension of legacies.6
Decentralize the Event. It makes more sense to spread 
demand spatially rather than build permanent facilities to 
accommodate peak demand. Events that take place in one 
city mean a few days or weeks of intense strain for public 
transport and accommodation. Instead of building many 
venues in the same place, venues should be distributed 
across a city or perhaps even to other cities. Los Angeles in 
1984 and Vancouver in 2010 practiced such a  decentralized 
model and thus avoided building excessive transport capac-
ity (see Liao & Pitts, 2006). 
Build Temporary Structures Where Afteruse Is 
Uncertain. Building temporary facilities such as sports 
venues can both be cheaper than building permanent facili-
ties and eliminate maintenance costs after the event for 
facilities that are hardly used or would otherwise be too 
large. Construction costs of temporary venues are between 
one-half and two-thirds of those of permanent venues 
(Long, 2013). London made extensive use of temporary 
venues for the 2012 Summer Games, where organizers 
built 11 of the 34 competition venues as temporary struc-
tures from scratch (May & Cardwell, 2012). There is, 
however, a drawback to temporary structures: They in-
crease event-specifi c expenditure that is unproductive for 
urban  development, so hosts must weigh the costs and 
benefi ts in each case.
Engage in Knowledge Exchange. Better knowledge 
exchange among past and future hosts can alleviate uncer-
tainty in the demand for infrastructure and services during 
the event. It can also avoid reinventing the wheel where 
effi cient solutions are available elsewhere, thus reducing 
budget and time overruns. While the IOC and FIFA have 
started knowledge transfer programs, these are focused on 
the organizing committees, which are in charge of the 
operation of the event. To be effective,  however, such 
programs also have to encompass the  organizations respon-
sible for delivering the infrastructure and other services for 
the event.
Do Not Bypass Regular Planning Procedures. Regular 
planning procedures should remain in force for mega-events, 
even though their fi xed deadlines increase time pressures. 
These procedures exist to ensure equal consideration of 
interests, rational decision making, and fair tendering and 
bidding. To override regular procedures increases the risk of 
nontransparent decisions that favor certain stakeholders 
over others. 
Conclusion
In this study, I make the case that there is a discernable 
mega-event syndrome: a set of seven major symptoms that 
affl ict mega-event planning. Together, these symptoms too 
often turn mega-events into obstacles rather than boons to 
urban development. The mega-event syndrome results in 
oversized or obsolete infrastructure for an infl ated price 
that the public is forced to pay and in an uneven and 
ineffi cient allocation of resources. These symptoms repeat 
themselves, to a greater or lesser degree, in mega-events 
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Müller: The Mega-Event Syndrome 15
around the globe. I suggest some incremental changes that 
can improve the outcomes of mega-events for local hosts, 
but the more marginal changes can only go so far in 
 reducing the negative impacts on hosts.
Radical changes to the rules of the games—in how 
mega-events are planned, awarded, and governed—are 
needed. These more radical changes may require outside 
pressure from a critical public, social movements, NGOs, 
the media, or corporate sponsors. In recent years, we have 
witnessed an escalating spiral in which ever-greater require-
ments and costs for mega-events have compelled cities to 
promise ever-greater projects. The most important radical 
change cities could adopt is to stop bundling mega-event 
planning with large-scale urban development, which comes 
with a higher risk of cost overruns, substandard construc-
tion quality, oversized infrastructure, and a lack of 
 democratic participation. Tying development projects to 
mega-events makes the already complex planning for 
mega-events even more complex because it increases the 
number of interdependent elements. 
There has been a marked decline in communities 
willing to host mega-events driven by the record of recent 
mega-events that provided limited benefi ts at exorbitant 
costs, such as the 2014 World Cup in Brazil and the 
2014  Winter Games in Sochi. The 2022 Winter Olympics 
have turned into the “Games that no one seems to want” 
( Wilson, 2014), after Munich, Oslo, Stockholm, 
St. Moritz/Davos, Krakow, and Lviv refrained from 
 submitting bids or withdrew them. The remaining two 
contenders in the race—Kazakhstan and China—could 
portend the future of mega-events as lavish image projects 
in resource-rich, autocratic states with little public 
 accountability and limited freedom of speech. The bids for 
the 2024 Olympic Summer Games and the 2026 Football 
World Cup are now under way, and the United States 
stands a high chance of winning both if it decides to bid. 
Debates and actions to counteract the mega-event syn-
drome must start now, early in the bid phase, when the 
basic parameters can still be changed. 
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Notes
1. Event-governing bodies argue that the use of public funds for non-
sports-related infrastructure, such as for transport or communications, 
should be seen as investment and thus not counted as costs of a mega-
event. This line of argument, however, is only partly correct. The 
problem is that, as seen before, mega-events may change what infra-
structure is built—what is required for the event and not what has the 
greatest public utility—and its size. In addition, mega-events infl ate the 
price tag for infrastructure through the mechanisms discussed in 
Symptom 2. As such, the public still risks paying for overpriced but 
underused infrastructure.
2. The displacement of 700,000 residents in the run-up to the 1988 
Olympic Games in Seoul and more than a million residents for the 
2008 Beijing Olympic Games, however, must also be seen as situations 
where events were part and parcel of a larger redevelopment strategy and 
thus not the only driver and cause of displacement (Davis, 2011).
3. However, as mentioned earlier, some elites profi t from this ineffi cient 
allocation of resources, so there is an incentive for them to overbuild. 
Some policy changes discussed later in this study can reduce this 
incentive. 
4. In 2003, the IOC published a report condemning the growing size of 
the Olympic Games and issued more than 100 mostly operational 
recommendations to counteract this trend (Olympic Games Study 
Commission, 2003). The IOC also asks for bid books to detail how 
Olympic planning fi ts into the long-term development plans of the host, 
and IOC members are asked to take this into account when voting for a 
host. Beginning in 2001, it standardized the organization of the event 
and introduced a knowledge transfer system to make organizational 
processes more effi cient. Despite past reforms, however, the IOC has been 
unable to reverse, stop, or even noticeably slow the growth of the Olym-
pics (Chappelet, 2014). The Olympic Agenda 2020, passed in December 
2014, steps up efforts to enhance transparency, reducing the cost and size 
and maximizing the use of existing or temporary infrastructure. It yet has 
to show whether it can be more effective than its predecessors.
5. As an adverse effect, this implication may encourage investments into 
infrastructure in anticipation of increasing chances to win an event, but 
these investments would then occur without the fi xed deadline of the 
event, the state of legal exception, and a number of other symptoms, 
and it would be harder to justify event-specifi c expenditure vis-à-vis 
citizens if an event has not been awarded. 
6. The IOC has recognized the need for keeping the terms of the 
hosting agreement stable and for decentralization in its Agenda 2020, 
adopted in December 2014 (Recommendation 1).
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